Photo credits: Karolina Shmalko and Iryna Seleznyova. 

In wartime Ukraine, the battle against corruption is just as critical as the battle against Russia. In July 2025, a sudden political move to weaken Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions sparked mass protests—and a rapid government U-turn. In this blog, TPP Associate and Ukrainian lawyer Andrii Biletskyi explains the political economy factors behind this anti-corruption drama, and why strong, independent institutions are essential to Ukraine’s survival and its Euro-Atlantic future.

Ukraine has been commanding world headlines since February 2022: a country fighting for its life against a brutal and unjustified full-scale Russian attack, as well as trying to reform its government institutions and head towards European and NATO integration.

But at the very end of July 2025, Ukraine was in the headlines for all the wrong reasons: a political attempt to weaken its anti-corruption bodies, in a move that has badly affected President Zelenskyy’s domestic and international reputation, and threatened to unravel a decade of hard-fought anti-corruption progress.

Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration requires the country to make significant progress in, among other things, fighting corruption. This is embedded not only in formal policy documents such as the EU Rule of Law roadmap and the EU Ukraine Facility Plan or in the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility, but also in the political consciousness of Ukraine’s allies. Financial support by the EU, the IMF, World Bank and others are conditioned on demonstrable improvements in this sector. Any success or failure in this sphere rings out loudly among Western partners. The events of July 2025 served as a bitter reminder.

Government makes first move

On 22 July 2025, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted Law No. 12414. Initially, it appeared to be a procedural bill related to investigations of missing people in times of war. In reality, however, it was hijacked: amendments were submitted, that directly targeted the centrepiece of Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure.

The formal justification for the reforms was framed as a bid to “strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency” of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), as well as a reaction to alleged Russian infiltration of these institutions. However, no credible evidence was given. Procedural violations in the process of adopting the amendments only discredited the assumption that such considerations were the reason for what was, in effect, an attempted political coup.

These reforms took away NABU and SAPO’s procedural independence and subordinated them to the Prosecutor General – a political appointee, nominated by the President and approved by Parliament. The law was rushed through Parliament at lightning speed, reminding one of the “turbo mode” legislative activity in 2019, and signed into law by the President on the same day.

Unsurprisingly, the backlash was immediate. Protests erupted across Ukraine, demanding the reversal of the law and restoration of NABU and SAPO’s independence. Western partners (U.S.,EU, the UK and G7 countries) issued sharp statements questioning Ukraine’s commitment to rule-of-law reforms.

But the protests weren’t just about this law. They were a culmination of frustration over a series of questionable moves made by the government, starting from the refusal to appoint the winner of an open competition for the position of the Director of the Bureau of Economic Security, and the attempted prosecution of prominent anti-corruption activist Vitalii Shabunin.

Protesters led by the Anti Corruption Action Center (ANTAC) came to the building of the SAPO to demand Kholodnytskyi’s dismissal. Photo: Facebook/ANTAC

Why Now? The Political Economy Behind the “Reform”

Why would President Zelenskyy, who visited NABU back in 2019 to motivate its staff and who promised them full support, suddenly turn against the same institutions that symbolised Ukraine’s fight against corruption?

The reason is quite clear: NABU detectives were getting uncomfortably close to the President’s inner circle.

Over the years, NABU and SAPO have investigated high-profile figures linked to the ruling party, including Members of Parliament and, most notably, Oleh Tatarov who is the Deputy Head of the Presidential Office and a figure with a controversial past from the Yanukovych era.

The situation reached its boiling point when NABU and SAPO served a notice of suspicion to Oleksiy Chernyshov, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of National Unity, for abuse of power and bribery. It was followed by yet another high-profile investigation that hit the headlines:  searches in a former Deputy Head of the Presidential Office’s foreign apartment in Germany together with German law enforcement agencies. And, to top it off, there were reports that NABU was preparing charges against one of the President’s closest friends and business partners from his “Kvartal-95” days. Suddenly, the anti-corruption crusader found himself tangled in the very “old corrupt system” he had promised to dismantle.

Civil Society Strikes Back

On the day of the vote, protests broke out across Ukraine. Mostly young people took to the streets, shattering the political leadership’s hopes for a passive response. Despite weeks of coordinated disinformation campaigns via anonymous Telegram channels (see analytics from Texty.org), the public didn’t buy the narrative that anti-corruption institutions were ineffective or infiltrated by foreign agents. After just two days of protests, the President submitted a draft law to Parliament to reverse the controversial amendments. An alternative version was also introduced by a group of 48 MPs.

But let’s be clear: these proposals aimed only to undo the damage, not to strengthen NABU and SAPO’s independence.

A Poison Pill in the Repeal Law?

While the President’s move to reverse the law was welcomed, his draft came with a significant catch. It included a provision requiring Ukraine’s Security Service to conduct security screenings of all NABU and SAPO staff with access to state secrets within six months. The aim? To identify anyone suspected of acting in the interests of the aggressor state.

However, in practice, this could become a dangerous lever of executive influence over ongoing investigations, particularly those implicating powerful political figures. Even indirect ties, such as family members in Russia, could be weaponised to remove detectives and prosecutors. This isn’t a theoretical risk. A similar argument was used to block the appointment of the winner of the Bureau of Economic Security competition.

Where Do We Stand Now?

On July 31, Parliament adopted the President’s repeal law, formally restoring NABU and SAPO’s procedural independence. But while the immediate crisis was resolved, the scars remain, both domestically and internationally.

The episode exposed two things:

1. Ukraine’s civil society is still a formidable force capable of reversing bad policy decisions.

2. The battle over control of anti-corruption institutions is far from over. Attempts to undermine their independence may become more subtle, but they won’t stop.

In a country fighting for its survival, it’s tempting to downplay governance issues as secondary to the war effort. But Ukraine’s ability to resist external aggression is inseparable from its ability to build institutions that are resilient to internal power grabs.

This blog has been cross-posted on the LSE Activism, Influence and Change Programme (AICP) blog.