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The findings of this Brief reflect the opinions of the authors and not those of the African Development Bank, its Board of Directors or the countries they represent.

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## A Five Lenses Framework for Analyzing the Political Economy in Regional Integration

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### 1 | Introduction

The great many benefits offered by regional integration has now been widely studied. Whenever divergences have existed between agreements underlying regional economic communities and their implementation, it has often been attributed to 'political will' and 'capacity'<sup>1</sup>. Regional integration agreements involve a complex set of arrangements that attempt to harmonize 'economic systems' across countries. These agreements are often instituted with relative ease in countries/regions where formal institutions have matured. Elsewhere, where these same institutions are only taking root, the challenges are stiffer but not insurmountable. In this brief we provide a political economic exploration of the constraints to regional integration using 'five lenses'. Specifically, we look at the political drivers and constraints to regional integration in the East African Community; and the North-South Corridor project of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite.

### 2 | A political economy approach to studying regional integration

A growing body of literature emphasizes the interaction between broader set of

structural, institutional and agency variables in order to assess the benefits of regional integration arrangements<sup>2</sup>, state-business relations and donor-aid-recipient relationships. Their analytical frameworks by and large converge on four specific interactions: (a) structural factors, (b) formal and informal institutions, (c) actors, agency and incentives, (d) and the sector or sub-sector-specific governance characteristics. We add a fifth dimension that completes the analysis –the interaction between external factors and domestic and regional political economy. The broad schema is presented below.


The analytical framework considers the interaction between five sets of factors that are briefly defined below. Structural factors are historical processes, or geographic factors that have shaped the types of political, economic and socio-cultural institutions that create incentives for different sets of actors in the present. Formal and informal institutions are a combination of market and non-market institutions that govern economic and political competition (the rule of law, property rights enforcement) and supporting informal arrangements such as rule-based access to credit, indiscriminate disbanding of monopoly privi-

<sup>1</sup> Briceño-Garmandia, C. and Foster, V. (editors), 2010; and Putnam, R.D., 1988.

<sup>2</sup> Kelsall, T. 2013.

leges). Political agency issues refer to the interaction between political and economic structures and institutions that shape the incentives of the state, economic elite, firms, farms and households. The lens particularly focuses on the influence of the economic elite on key policy reforms. Sector characteris-

tics identify quirk of key sectors. For instance monopolies in the transport or energy sectors imply limited incentives to improve productivity. External factors influence regional economic relationships and consumer behaviour (Clean Diamond Trade Act, bans on international trade in illegally logged timber).



### 3 | Regional Integration in the East African Community: Rwanda and Tanzania

The EAC is arguably the sub-region of the continent furthest ahead on the integration path. This group is moving from its initial status as a trading regime with common tariffs and harmonized standards toward much more profound institutional, infrastructural and identity development. For example, the EAC has already established an East African Legislative Assembly, an East African Court of Justice and the Lake Victoria Basin Commission (AfDB, 2014c). Yet implementation of thornier issues such as the common market protocol, targeted to be implemented by 2015, is widely recognised to be behind schedule. Some aspects such as movement of people face the greatest challenges, although an East African passport has been approved for issuance to the region’s citizens by November 2015.

Applying the five political economy lenses to specific implementation gaps helps identify some of the drivers and obsta-

cles to the regional agenda. This section zooms in on two EAC member states, Rwanda and Tanzania. In the case of the broader EAC Group, the five lenses may help better understand the drivers behind the recent emergence of a “coalition of the willing”.

#### a) Structural factors in East African integration

Clearly a wide range of long-term structural factors influences country position on EAC integration. EAC member states face many common challenges relating to infrastructure deficits, reliance on small-scale rural agricultural employment, a limited industrial base, and large informal sectors.

Still, the EAC member states are at different stages of political maturity or structural transformation. Kenya has the largest economy in the region, representing 37 per cent of EAC GDP and the highest GDP per capita (PPP valuation) at US\$1,796 in 2013, with the capital, Nairobi, as the regional commercial

hub. Kenya is considered East Africa's powerhouse and has the most diversified economy. Its population of approximately 44.354 million inhabitants is just behind Tanzania with 49.253 million in 2013 (AfDB, et al., 2014).

Together, the Tanzanian and Kenyan economies represent 70 per cent of the EAC economy compared with Rwanda and Burundi that represent only 6 per cent and 2 per cent, respectively of the regional economy. Burundi has an average income of only US\$521 and a population of 10.162 million (*ibid.*). Further, three of the five EAC countries are landlocked, increasing their potential gains from lowering the costs of land-based imports through regional integration, an incentive that is not present for the two coastal countries that compete with one another and other coastal countries for port traffic.

Kenya is the gateway to East Africa and the largest economy within the EAC. Kenya currently enjoys membership in the EAC, COMESA and IGAD communities. Kenya's neighbours are important trading partners with the EAC, accounting for 26% of its exports. Kenyan businesses have benefited from the liberalization of rules on movement of services in the EAC. Over the last five years, both exports and imports have registered upward trends. Exports averaged 27% of GDP with almost half going to Africa, mostly to Eastern African countries (AfDB, 2014c).

For Tanzania, EAC markets generally play a far smaller role as an export destination with the exception of some manufacturing exports to Kenya (e.g. Willenbockel, 2012). For the EAC as a whole, export growth over the last decade has been highly concentrated in primary commodities, mainly oriented to developed and emerging markets, underlining the need for greater regional integration to promote intra-regional trade and greater value-addition (TMEA, 2013).

From a historical perspective, the EAC has been described as an unfinished project in restoring the regional integration that East Africa once enjoyed almost half a century ago (Collier, 2012). Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have a long history of formal regional cooperation including a customs union between Kenya and Uganda in 1917, later joined by then Tanganyika (Schiff and winters, 2003). The EAC in its current form came into being with the treaty of 1999, with Rwanda and Burundi joining in 2007 (EAC, 2013). EAC membership represented a reorientation for these new members from colonial era ties to their francophone Western neighbours, to their Anglophone neighbours in the East. There was an accompanying switch in Rwanda from French to English as the principal language to be used apart from Kinyarwanda.

## b) Formal and informal institutions

These historical features (decolonisation, past efforts at integration, etc.) or structural factors (trading patterns, differences in size of the economy, landlocked and gateway countries) can affect the EAC driven regional integration process in positive and negative ways. Positively, they can underpin institutional alignment at a formal level for the three original EAC countries. Certain historic processes also work at an informal level, for example maintaining a sense of East African identity, principally among political elites and leaders (Booth et al, 2007). They may also provide a basis for allegiances and rivalries among member states.

The EAC has succeeded in establishing a range of formal organs. However, indicative of wider concerns, the EAC has achieved greater convergence in simplifying and lowering the cost of regulatory processes for businesses than in providing the implementation teeth to those legal institutions that are relevant to business regulation (IFC, 2013).

Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) offer a telling example of the gaps between formal rules of the game and implementation. Partner states had formally agreed to remove NTBs by December 2012. However, in the absence of a legally binding framework and the necessary monitoring and implementation mechanisms, compliance among the member states varies according to political commitment or buy-in from state and non-state stakeholders. As such, businesses continue to incur huge costs arising from the erratic use of weighbridges, roadblocks, poor infrastructure, unnecessary delays at border posts, and lack of harmonised import and export standards, procedures and documentation. As research on transport and transport corridors have indicated, informal rent-seeking practices seem to undermine the efforts at strengthening the formal institutions to reduce NTBs (Pinard, 2011 and 2010; Raballand et al 2009; McLinden et al, 2011; Arvis et al, 2011).

In the trade field, one can also point to the common market protocol, which entered into force in July 2010. It is supposed to be fully implemented by December 2015, having achieved the "four freedoms" within the common market of free movement of people, goods, services and capital. Monetary union is scheduled to be achieved in 2020. To achieve this requires closer harmonisation and coordination of regional policies and implementation of protocols. Reportedly, Rwanda is the only country to have complied so far with agreed deadlines, which seems to converge with the broader developmental policies and implementation arrangements that the ruling elite in Rwanda has adopted. In the other member states, there ap-

pears to be slippage in the implementation of this and other formal agreements, mainly because of a range of less visible concerns and political positions that hinder progress.

Both Tanzania and Uganda are alleged to be erecting barriers to Kenyan exports through their interpretation of EAC Rules of Origin and disputes over imported inputs. Kenya and Tanzania are also implicitly in competition to service the hinterland markets of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. One recent report suggests Tanzania is replacing Kenya as the most desirable investment destination in the region. Some also suggest that Kenya's status as the region's logistics hub may be under threat after Tanzania signed a deal with China to set up the region's largest port at Bago-moyo, which will potentially be bigger than the Dar es Salaam and Mombasa ports combined. Otherwise, China is also investing in oil pipelines, container infrastructure and railways through Kenya.

It is hard to discuss formal and informal institutions without also mentioning the substantial amount of informal trade that continues to take place between all countries in the EAC. As in most regions in Africa, informal cross-border trade is an important element of economic life in the EAC involving firms active in the informal and formal economy. Lesser and Moisé-Leeman (2009) cite estimates that informal exports from Uganda to its five neighbouring countries in 2006 accounted for around 86 per cent of its official exports to these countries, while informal imports were estimated at 19 per cent of official import flows from these countries. Such trade takes place in spite of rather than supported by regional integration initiatives. The scale of informal trade for a country such as Uganda reminds of the distance between what is being dealt with the formal trade as it is being dealt with in regional trade protocols and the full reality of trade on the ground.

### c) Actors, political elites and agency

At a rhetorical level all EAC members support integration narratives. Yet in practice, some agreements are only partially implemented, and often not by all member countries of the EAC. Moreover, recently, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have formed a "coalition of the willing" within the EAC to move at their own chosen speed with integration. In order to understand phenomena such as implementation gaps and variable geometries, it helps to unpack the often less visible dynamics and motives of ruling coalitions within the state, as well as those of bureaucrats and sector actors, in particular influential private sector stakeholders or pressure groups. This sec-

tion zooms in on a new and an old EAC member, Rwanda and Tanzania. Rwanda illustrates the strong drive of the ruling elite behind integration within EAC. Tanzania presents a mix of drivers and obstacles that lead to ambiguities in the implementation of regional agenda. One feature meriting attention is that of the quality of leadership, for example the leadership ability of the elite or factions within it to act in a coordinated way, to mobilise along common interests, to understand the nature of dominant incentives, etc. In terms of inter-country cooperation, collaboration between presidents or other top politicians has sometimes contributed to kick-start cooperation and integration processes.

### d) Global drivers and their impact on the domestic political economy

The efforts of Tanzania's political elite to preserve its hegemony over power may be affected by conflicting issues such as continuing low agricultural productivity, competition from outside producers and the negative impact of certain regional tariff measures within the EAC on Zanzibar producers. At the same time, the Tanzanian government is keen to be seen as an important reformer within the international development community and in Africa. It has been one of the first countries to become part of Grow Africa, a global development programme that emerged out of the World Economic Forum and the G8's Global Alliance for Food Security, and that engages with the international private sector. Such programmes and processes are to a large extent externally driven, as they create political incentives through the (promise of) donor money and investments that influence the domestic political economy.

In the case of Rwanda, some donors have expressed apprehensions about the ways in which the country seeks to guarantee the integrity of its borders and national security. This has resulted in uncertainty about the reliability of some of the external funding of the Rwanda budget.

## 4 | What are the drivers of regional transport? Comparing political economy features in Southern and Eastern Africa

The EAC example covers the broad integration agenda. The same five lenses can be usefully applied to more narrowly defined regional integration processes in a particular sector, sub-sector or cluster of sectors. Given the growing focus on transport corridors in Africa, this second case compares the

Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) with the North-South Corridor (NSC).<sup>3</sup>

In the case of the NSC, it is informative to look at this multi-country transport corridor in terms of the politics that surround it from a Zambian perspective. Zambia sits at the centre of the NSC and as a landlocked country that might be expected to have most to gain from it. The NSC is the relatively new flagship of three RECs (SADC, COMESA and EAC) seeking to coordinate and harmonise programmes in trade, trade facilitation and infrastructure development through improvements to road, rail and ports.<sup>4</sup> This transport corridor can be contrasted with the older Maputo Development Corridor, which dates from the mid-1990s and has already led to improved road and rail connections, reduced border times, and related major industrial investments in Mozambique. Applying the five lenses can help identify important differences between the two corridor initiatives with potential implications for policy-makers.

#### a) Structural factors in transport corridors in Southern and East Africa

For the most part, both corridors build on pre-independence road and rail connections that were constructed to serve the interests of mining capital and their hunger for cheap labour. South Africa relied heavily on migrant labour from the sub-region, including from Southern Mozambique. As of 1895 it shipped out coal and other minerals along the railroad from the then Witwatersrand to deep water port of Lourenço Marques, now Maputo.

The MDC project can therefore be understood as the rehabilitation of a pre-existing transport corridor, which in the past served a restricted group of users. The project was driven by three profound changes, including regime change in South Africa after the first non-racial, democratic elections in 1994, the accompanying shift from apartheid destabilisation, and by peace and democracy in Mozambique as of 1992. As such, the two neighbours were in the process of designing strategies to reform their economies, re-establish improved diplomatic and economic links, and attract public and private investment.

The NSC emerged from different historical origins. The predecessor to COMESA took shape in 1978 with the proposal for a sub-regional Preferential Trade Area (PTA), which was finally established by a treaty in Lusaka in 1981. The PTA treaty called for a gradual transition to a common market that began

in 1993 with the signing of the COMESA Treaty. The Tripartite Initiative then emerged from COMESA and SADC, both of which can also trace back their roots to the Frontline States movement. In terms of infrastructure development, at its Northern end it builds on the TAZARA rail, TanZam Highway, and the TAZAMA crude oil pipeline between Tanzania and Zambia. Landlocked Zambia desperately needed in those days an alternative outlet for its copper production as three neighbours were no solid gateways (apartheid South Africa, Rhodesia under minority rule until 1980, colonial rule of Mozambique until 1975 with a subsequent civil war and apartheid infrastructure destruction). Despite being landlocked the country increasingly serves growing markets of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola. As member of both SADC and COMESA it can market itself.

#### b) Formal and Informal Institutions

Although part of the SADC region and a potentially important access port for countries beyond South Africa and Mozambique (Botswana, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, for example), the MDC has taken shape independently from formal regional frameworks and procedures. It was launched as a South Africa driven Spatial Development Initiative (SDI), involving soft and hard infrastructure development in a toll road and a railway, as well as port development, industrial investment cluster, improved border management and initially even a commitment – according to the public-private facilitating Maputo Corridor Company - to serve “disadvantaged communities” (Byiers and Vanheukelom, 2014). The institutional drive originated from South Africa’s Department of Transport, the Cabinet of the President and from the Department of Trade and Industry. In order to attract investments, the South African government had endorsed the concept of public-private partnerships (PPPs). The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) was drawn in, and the SDIs became a testing ground for inter-governmental cooperation within South Africa, and for inter-governmental coordination with neighbours such as Swaziland and Mozambique. Macro-economic austerity and a strong push for results were key drivers for lean institutional arrangements that drew on the strengths of different public and private actors, in the absence of substantial external funding.

Later, the SADC Secretariat picked up the idea of SDIs and integrated it in the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan of 2003. More recently, incoming SADC Chair-

<sup>3</sup> This case study draws on Byiers and Vanheukelom 2013, and Vanheukelom et al 2014.

<sup>4</sup> It also aims at increasing the power generation and energy trade potential of the Southern African Power Pool with new power generation and transmission investments but these are not taken account of in this chapter.

man, President Guebuza of Mozambique, highlighted corridors as vehicles for SADC regional integration, which need to be harnessed due to the “role they play in consolidating social dimensions of development and the regional integration processes” (SADC, 2012a). One of the corridor projects of the SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (SADC, 2012b) is the NSC. Meanwhile, the NSC has become a flagship programme of the Priority Infrastructure Development Programme, and its railway link is being championed by South Africa’s president Zuma as one of the projects of the NEPAD Presidential Infrastructure Champion Initiative.

### c) *Actors, political elites and agency*

The above narrative suggests that movement towards completing the MDC was in line with a range of geographical and historical factors, and proceeded outside formal regional integration processes. In part, this was because of the strong relations of trust between key public stakeholders in the neighbouring countries, and especially the strong relations between the then Presidents of South African and Mozambique, Mr. Mandela and Mr. Chissano both thought of the initiative as economically strategic and symbolically important as the transport corridor marked the end of apartheid destabilisation and the beginning of Mozambique’s recovery plans and overtures to external investors and financiers. Fiscal deficits and the alignment of interests at both sides of the border resulted in a swift agreement on the need to carry out the road rehabilitation through a public-private partnership, one of the first in Africa, and in implementation arrangements that ensured that investments materialised, although at different speed for different components. The Presidential drive in each country also ensured sufficient bureaucratic drive behind implementation arrangements for the MDC.

Beyond public policy-makers and bureaucracies, the private sector also played a large part in pushing for funding and implementing different aspects of a viable transport corridor. Not only was road rehabilitation and maintenance carried out under a PPP arrangement with a long-term private concession, the corridor initiative was also accompanied by multi-million dollar investments in the aluminium smelter Mozal I and II (plus adjacent industrial park) near the Mozambican capital and harbour. Given the need for Mozal to import almost everything, and export almost all outputs, key aspects for the Mozal investment related to access to electricity from South African Eskom,<sup>5</sup> access to the ports and transport. Although some have criticised the lack of integration and the rather narrow deve-

lopment impact of Mozal and other investments in the Belu-luane Industrial Park (see Byiers and Vanheukelom, 2014), the investments nonetheless helped drive the MDC project forward, with combined pressures for road improvements and investments in rail infrastructure, one-stop border posts, and improved port management.

Mostly private actors created new private sector associations to attract investors, monitor progress in multiple components of the MDC, and facilitate exchanges on new and inclusive development opportunities. The Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative (MCLI), for example, is such a private sector association of (mostly South African) firms using the corridor. It has also linkages with civil society, donors and public authorities at different levels at both sides of the border. The MDC has equally been a positive development for Maputo elites who gained easier access to retail and tourism services in South Africa, while the concession company running the main road along the corridor and the company operating the container scanner at the port also represent business interests for some high-level Mozambican politicians. While not a driving force, this clearly also factors into the political economy of the process of MDC implementation and further development.

While the MDC is narrow in scope, the NSC is clearly a much broader, more ambitious undertaking with correspondingly greater coordination challenges and less clearly identified beneficiaries. The costs and benefits are, moreover, unevenly spread, with numerous collective action failures (such as free-riding) to be expected. The NSC is also very much about building infrastructures and improving border posts, with little ostensible direct involvement of the private sector, either through the promotion of accompanying investments or in consultation. Indeed, in Zambia, a country that might be expected to be a major beneficiary of the NSC, private sector discourse is clearly more focused on general business conditions and meeting the demands of the markets of Eastern Angola and the DRC. At the same time, there is a domestic constituency that fears competition from South African producers and that is well served with thick borders, poor transport infrastructure and high transport prices and costs in a non-competitive transport environment, etc. Indeed, Zambian membership of both the SADC and COMESA free trade areas (FTAs) provides the potential for the country to position itself as a regional trading hub – but also may harm the Zambian companies that export to the region as it may place them at risk of competition from imports from Kenya and South Africa, countries that have relatively speaking a deep industrial base. If one seeks to understand the incentives for po-

<sup>5</sup> Eskom is South Africa’s public electricity utility.

litical elites, and the likely pressures from different sections of the private sector in Zambia, a more granular analysis of the key actors is required.

In terms of the analytical framework, the analysis needs to be complemented with a consideration of both the technical and political features of the particular sector or sub-sector that is under discussion. Different categories of stakeholders and actors respond or interact in different ways to these particularities.

#### d) Sectoral Characteristics

Roads are highly visible public goods, offering potential political gain for political elites if they can demonstrate their patronage over road construction. Other aspects of the road sub-sector – such as maintenance – are less politically attractive, or even harmful for political elites. This is clearly illustrated by the resistance against policies that seek to introduce tolls for road users as a measure to ensure financial sustainability of road maintenance. The MDC is a toll road, which, before arriving to the port in Maputo, passes through Matola, an increasingly urbanised and growing suburb of Maputo. Daily commuters from Matola to Maputo therefore use a small section of the MDC and pay a toll for this use. While the tolls contribute to the overall upkeep and maintenance of the road, they also create problems for the government given political resistance to tolls.

In a different way, the case of Zambia also highlights how policy preferences in the transport sector are shaped by specific sector characteristics. The political attractiveness of rural road construction projects, for example, proved to be more attractive in electoral terms for the incumbent political elite in Zambia. Indeed, while Zambia is landlocked, the late President Sata's government prioritised national rural roads over the regional flagship NSC. As mentioned, roads have a particular political resonance, and in Zambia political dynamics have meant that even where roads have been considered to carry insufficient traffic to merit tarmac, the government has committed to 'Link Zambia 8,000 Project / Pave Zambia', probably because of its vote catching potential.

#### e) Global and regional drivers and their impact on the domestic political economy

International investment in the form of Mozal has been pivotal for getting MDC off the ground, with the continuing high prices for aluminium providing sufficient incentives for a se-

cond phase to be built. International demand for South Africa's coal has also put pressure on existing South African ports, providing strong incentives to use the port of Maputo, thereby affecting demand for use of the MDC as an outlet to the sea. Donor pressures were absent at the South African end, except to say that the South African Rand was under pressure, and there was a strong political commitment of the newly elected ANC government towards macro-economic stability. So the pressure was on the state to facilitate private sector financing in infrastructure development, resulting in the first toll road concession PPP in Africa. At the Mozambican end, external pressures consisted of World Bank imposed conditionalities. These were targeted at macro-economic discipline, as well as at privatisation of the Maputo Port in order to reduce dwell time of goods, fight corruption and lower handling costs more generally.

In the case of the NSC, there is an important global demand for minerals, which remains a driver behind corridor development, with the majority of Zambian copper exports, for example, being channelled through Durban. As importantly, it seems, have been the efforts from external development partners. The NSC was launched as a pilot Aid for Trade project, so building on a combined interest from African countries in the region and the World Trade Organisation's renewed enthusiasm for linking trade and aid. The AU/NEPAD priority infrastructure programme, i.e., the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA): 2010–2040 as promoted by the AU's NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NEPAD Agency) and the AfDB seeks to reinforce this process with the potential private and public funders or investors. Such support may create incentives for overcoming certain coordination failures. But it may, of course also result in cherry picking, as the NSC remains a collection of more or less bankable projects. Increasingly, new donors have demonstrated their preferences in infrastructure development, and this will also have an influence on programmes and processes such as NSC and MDC.

## 5| Conclusions

This brief presented a framework for identifying the political economy actors and factors behind regional cooperation and/or regional integration, and for analysing relations that shape the outcomes of regional processes. There is a growing interest in political economy diagnostics, as efforts at regional cooperation and/or regional integration encounter seemingly intractable obstacles, whether implemented or promoted by public or private partners, by mandated regional organisations, and often combinations of all with support from external de-

velopment partners. This brief suggests five analytical lenses to analyse the political economy context, to help structure the tacit knowledge about political dimensions.

Applications of this analytical approach – for example facilitated by key players such as development partners, multilateral development banks, etc. – may deepen the understanding of the political feasibility of reforms by informing about the relations between structural dimensions, (formal and informal) institutions, sector specific governance features, global and regional drivers and how these create political and other incentives for key stakeholders in the short and longer term. This is clearly work in progress, but in order to illustrate the potential usefulness of the applied framework, two cases were briefly introduced.

The case of the East African Community compares a new member state, Rwanda, with an older member state, Tanzania. The five lenses assessment of some of the regional policies and implementation arrangements adopted by the two countries helps identify structural, institutional and agency drivers behind these measures. It also helps think through some of the implications of specific governance and accountability characteristics of a particular sub-sector. For the ruling elite in Rwanda, the membership of EAC and its integration agenda seems to represent a higher policy priority than for Tanzania given the Rwandan government's reliance on economic opportunities in the region for its strategy of developmental regime survival. Tanzania, on the other hand has a more ambivalent relationship to regional agreements that it subscribes to, as the case of rice imports and the CET suggests. The ruling elite in Tanzania operates under different political and economic institutions, in that it faces different competitive pressures in a context in which rents are redistributed in fragmented ways. Fears of losing elections in Zanzibar, moreover, created pressures in opposite directions from policies favouring food security and the application of the EAC CET on rice.

The second case revolved around one established and one emerging transport corridor in Southern and East Africa. The five lenses help identify the structural, historic, institutional, leadership, private sector and bureaucratic components behind

the relative success in the older Maputo Development Corridor between South Africa's industrial heartland and the port of Maputo. Unlike the newer NSC between Dar es Salaam and Durban, this bundle of soft and hard infrastructure development initiatives was organised between only three countries, with one powerful driver behind the wheels, and two Presidents in support. In the case of the NSC, there is a combined involvement of the African Union and its PIDA, the NEPAD Agency, the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement, the eight member states through which this transport corridor transits, with support from AfDB and other financing institutions.

Given this multiplicity of actors or stakeholders the potential distribution of benefits and costs is much harder to calculate, prioritisation of projects is more cumbersome and the risk of freeriding greater. While this is also precisely the prime motivation for a supranational approach – there are numerous other constraining factors, some of which are well illustrated by applying the lenses to landlocked Zambia. Despite the formal commitment to the realisation of the NSC, Zambia has prioritised rural road construction, as that seemed to be a more rewarding political strategy among the incumbent elite who faced electoral defeat. In particular the fourth lens zooms in on sector specific political and governance characteristics: obviously paving Zambian rural roads has a stronger appeal to rural voters than tending for a piece of transport corridor, or improving border management. And road rehabilitation, for that matter, is less popular than road construction because it lacks political visibility. Governance and accountability features in particular (sub-) sectors need to be properly assessed and addressed by reformers as the number of sectors tends to multiply in the context of cross-border cooperation, transport corridors, or RPG provision more generally.

While it is early days to draw too wide ranging conclusions, work with the five lenses seems to confirm that all the five lenses somehow need to be combined for a proper assessment of the political economy context of regional integration and cooperation. This way, political economy diagnostics can help inform dialogue with the range of state and non-state actors at national and regional levels on the feasibility of envisaged reforms; it can help (re-)orient support efforts by development partners, and it can also help identify knowledge gaps.



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