Everybody knew that Trump would be bad for the climate, but I think many are still surprised at the speed with which Trump has reversed Biden’s entire climate agenda. In his first week in office he (see the excellent analysis by the FT of the first week blitz (please note this article requires a subscription to FT)):

• lifted restrictions on oil and gas;

• scrapped decarbonization targets;

• dismantled the administrative architecture established to tackle climate change; ceased financial commitments to the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); and, of course,

• pulled out of the Paris Agreement, again.

For those who want to see serious action to tackle climate change, this is deeply depressing. But to formulate a strategy for how to respond, it is important to be clear-eyed about what Trump may mean for climate action globally.

I believe that there are three serious consequences for progress in tackling the climate:

     1. a slowing or even reversal of the US’s own transition;

     2. the spillover effects of US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement; and

     3. a global shift in the Zeitgeist towards ideas that lead to great harm and delay action on the climate.

Slowing the US’s transition

Blocking clean energy projects (even those in Republican states), and the promotion of oil and gas, including in new areas such as Alaska, will increase the emissions trajectory of the US and lock it in for a long time to come. With emissions of around 6.3 Gt CO2e per year, the US is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world. A combination of efficiency improvements and structural changes have led to a fall in emissions of 15% since 2007. This may now slow or reverse. While the economics of renewables is so compelling that it may still win out in the long-run, there can be no doubt that this administration is keen to promote oil and gas and will do all it can to lock-in that bias for as long as possible.

The knock-on effects of US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement

US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement will have an impact far wider than the change in its own emissions profile.

Reductions in climate funding and climate finance. Trump and Musk’s wanton destruction of the US Agency for International Development has dramatically reduced an important source of funding for poor countries to tackle climate change and development challenges more broadly (see CGD’s analysis of the worst affected countries). The US administration’s hostility to climate action is also affecting the far larger flows of climate finance. Since December, the six largest US banks have left the Net Zero Banking Alliance, following earlier departures from the Net Zero Insurance Alliance; Blackrock left the Net Zero Asset Manager’s Initiative. Big finance is seeing an opportunity both to release itself from the constraints of following science-based targets and to curry favour with the new administration.

Lowering of ambition. Many developing countries were already deeply disappointed with the low level of the New Collective Quantified Goal agreed at the Conference of Parties (COP) 29 in Baku last November. US withdrawal further emphasises that the resources previously promised are unlikely to arrive. Since most developing countries do not see themselves as having caused the problem, they want rich countries to pay for the complex transition needed. If they won’t, it is likely that many will lower their climate ambition to the little that can be achieved with domestic resources.

A shift to adaptation. If the world’s largest economy is not going to make serious efforts at mitigation, then the efforts of much smaller economies may seem a bit pointless. The planet’s warming depends on cumulative emissions. Why should poor countries cut emissions if the US simply emits more? Consequently, there may be a strong shift towards adaptation. Voters in all countries care about being protected from climate shocks and being supported to recover when disasters happen. There is a domestic political imperative to focus on adaptation, while there is very little for mitigation.

Hedging bets. A big question for the future of the Paris Agreement is whether China will take up a leadership role, including scaling up the provision of financing for other countries. If it does, then Paris may limp on. But Chinese finance is typically quite different from overseas development assistance and much more transactional. Many countries are already wary of extending their debts to China. Also, countries which are more exposed to the US economy do not want to be seen to side with China. Therefore, they may be reluctant to open doors to Chinese clean energy goods (e.g. solar panels, EVs) for fear of irritating the US, even if this slows their own climate transition.

Notwithstanding the above, many countries are still invested in the Paris Agreement. Climate change is a global problem that needs a global solution. Many share the views of former Vice President, Al Gore who, on the day of the Trump inauguration said “We were able to keep up the pace of climate action during the first Trump Administration, and it is urgent that we take up the mantle once again.” But the behaviour of countries will depend on whether Trump 2.0 is seen as (another) aberration, or a new normal that will continue beyond him. Increasingly, COP as a vehicle for change has lost political currency. While it has achieved some important plurilateral deals, cajoled significant funding, and perhaps reduced emissions relative to a counter-factual, it is widely seen as a failure since emissions are still rising. Its political window may be closing and it could collapse entirely.

Some countries will be actively exploring alternatives. For example, imagine if China were to form a climate treaty with South East Asian nations, reflecting the region’s desire for rapid growth and the exploitation of natural resources. The Paris Agreement might end up being replaced by a series of blocks, each aligned to different visions about the appropriate course of public policy. Such blocks may achieve less than a global deal on mitigation, but could serve the political desire for strategic alliances linking climate to security and trade.

But it seems unlikely that the Paris Agreement will die entirely. Indeed, one thing that might keep Paris alive is the hope that Trump’s regime will be short lived. Four years is not long. In addition to damaging the planet, Trump is embarking on measures that will hurt the US economy. It is possible that he will be unpopular in four years’ time. Voters may reject him and some semblance of the US as a responsible global citizen may re-emerge. If countries abandon Paris commitments now, they may seem fickle in four years if a different administration takes office. Most are therefore likely to tread water. They will not enter into significant new commitments (so their new Nationally Determine Contribution (NDC) offerings for COP30 may be weak), but they probably will not renege on existing ones. Their 2030 NDC commitments may not be met; but the failure to hit conditional NDCs can be blamed on Trump and the lack of funding.

The Zeitgeist

However, the most worrying aspect of Trump goes beyond the Paris Agreement. It is that he has lit the touchpaper for a shift in the Zeitgeist about climate. The right is on the rise and are seizing on climate as a rallying cry of everything that is wrong about the ‘liberal elite’ governments that they believe have left voters behind. This nationalist, isolationist idea has resonance for some. When people struggle to pay their energy bills at home, many warm to the idea that we should stop spending resources on helping address climate change abroad.

This shift in mindset is the real danger, and not just for climate action. Political ideas come in waves as political movements in one place feed on the success elsewhere. If the right-wing wave in the US leads to the success of the same ideas in Europe, then climate action is doomed (as is meaningful international cooperation on a wide range of issues). These ideas may lead to disaster, as they have before. Nationalism and isolationism are not a solution for anything. But it takes decades for political waves to pass; to avoid the worst ravages of climate change, we need to avert that wave now. It may be that the most effective support we can provide for climate action in the Global South is to counter and defeat the right-wing agenda at home.