


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# Civil Society in the Age of Crisis

JOHN CLARK

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**ABSTRACT** *Three crises dominate today's globalized political landscape: trans-national terrorism, financial crisis, and climate change. Collectively, these crises have hurt civil society organizations and constricted their political space. Rights of association and to state information (the foundations of civic engagement) have been eroded in the name of 'state security'; and their support base and financial viability have declined. While not a death knell for civil society, it is important to understand how these new threats arose, how they relate to and synergize with each other, and how they balance new opportunities. Whereas the diversity of views found in the 'anti-globalization movement' appeared to have advantages at the turn of the millennium (caricatured by the slogan that the movement espoused 'One big "NO!" and many small "YESSSES"'), today this appears more as a weakness—suggesting a lack of clarity, focus, and credibility. Yet, thanks to new technology and the growing confidence of civil society leadership in poorer countries, we are seeing the emergence of a new energy in civil society that focuses more on the processes of government than on its substance and which shows signs of transforming civic engagement and enhancing state accountability to citizens.*

**KEY WORDS:** Civil society, NGOs, globalization, terrorism, climate change, financial crisis

Today's political topography is dominated by a range of mountainous global crises—actual and emerging.<sup>1</sup> While other issues are extremely important, three peaks dominate: the global financial crisis and attendant unemployment; widening socio-cultural schisms emanating from the so-called war on terror; and climate change and the collapse of ecological systems. A 2005 global survey of citizens' concerns<sup>2</sup> confirms that these are the top worries of 62% of the world's public (GlobeScan, 2005). Myriad actors in civil society respond energetically to them and have significantly influenced public opinion and policy-makers; however, this article looks at the opposite direction of causality, asking how have these global crises moulded the contours of civil society itself?

I conclude that—while some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) demonstrate prescient analysis and various social movements are leaders of public opinion—these global crises have largely been tough on civil society. Together they have forged divisions, weakened its political influence and effectiveness, reduced citizen support for many civil

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society organizations (CSOs), led the public to see states (not CSOs) as ‘the saviour’, and exacerbated tensions between state and civil societies. Moreover, opponents of value-driven CSOs often adopt similar tactics, confusing the public about what civil society stands for.

While to date these have been warning tremors rather than major earthquakes, they are trends civil society must ponder. Do they warrant some shifts in tactics? Is there a case for forging alliance with allies in governments and official bodies or for focusing less on the *substance* of policy-making and more on its *processes* (i.e. governance, and specifically the institutional links between CSOs and the state, at local, national, and global levels)? Some view the critical contribution of CSOs and citizens as monitoring the use and abuse of state power, while others see this as the time for greater stridency to shake societies out of the apathy that permits policy-makers to leave the crises unresolved.

This article looks, in turn, at the three main crises and how they affect civil society. Many factors emerge, but a common one is that civil society has been more effective and united during the *identification and formation* stage of a crisis—when its task is getting the issue onto the agenda—than during the *resolution* stage. At the latter point, civil society tends to fragment. Variety in tactics for alerting public concern on a topic is a strength, but advocacy of wildly different, often contradictory, policy responses is divisive. Furthermore, the tactics required to convince politicians to change policy tend to be at odds with those for awakening interest within the broad public. The media-grabbing and colourful tactics of mass demonstrations and direct action tend to turn off policy-makers. I conclude that in the immediate future the prospects are rocky, but addressable.

All the crises are global in nature, require globally concerted responses, and can only be addressed meaningfully by governments, especially the most powerful ones. Hence, the fashion in the 1980s and 1990s for seeking ‘less government’ and more citizens’ action has manifestly turned round. Ronald Reagan, in his first inaugural address as President of USA in 1981, famously said ‘government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.’ This emphasis on rolling back the state provided additional space for civil society to grow. Today, however, OECD governments are mostly criticized for doing too *little*, not too much—for not enforcing stronger greenhouse gas restrictions, regulating banks, or building international consensus in fighting terrorism.

This new trend puts civil society relatively into the shade. There are signs that this may be leading to reduced financial and membership support, less traction with regard to influencing policy, and a more hostile environment for the sector. I now explore these trends as I look, in turn, at each of the major global crises, and I conclude with some tentative thoughts on future civil society strategies that might provide some protection.

### **Impact of the Global Economic Crisis**

The global economic crisis has impacted civil society in three principal ways. First, it has eroded the finances of CSOs (especially NGOs and trade unions). Secondly, the sector has been somewhat marginalized since it is not widely credited either for having foreseen the crisis or for presenting credible solutions. Thirdly, the financial meltdown and international economic precursors to it have revealed deepening divisions within the sector; while diversity is often a strength, for this issue, it manifests as confusion and lack of confidence. I now examine these factors in detail.

### *The Financial Hit*

Public contributions to CSOs generally dwindle as household budgets are squeezed, more people become unemployed (or fear becoming so), and there is increased anxiety about the security of mortgages and savings accounts. Although 2008 figures show only modest decreases, it appears that the downturn steepened in 2009.

The American Red Cross, for example, experienced a 30% drop in responses and contributions from new donors as well as a fall in corporate donations (in spite of heightened public concerns about disasters brought about by 2008's hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods)<sup>3</sup>. Across the USA, philanthropic organizations report similar trends and attribute them at least in part to the credit crisis and plunge of financial markets. An October 2008 survey of more than 2700 non-profit groups in the USA found that more than a third saw contributions decrease in the first nine months of 2008 and donations stagnated for another 25%. Furthermore, 49% of them anticipated a drop in income for the final quarter of 2008 compared with the previous year (GuideStar, 2008; McCoy & Dorell, 2008).

In Europe, the drop in public giving does not seem to be as great as elsewhere, but it is nevertheless real and could deepen. In the UK, a survey of large charities shows a 13% drop in contributions but an 18% increase in demand for their services. Twenty-nine percent of charities laid off staff and 56% curbed salary increases<sup>4</sup>.

For UK development NGOs, whose public contributions have grown continuously and steeply over the last 20 years, the concern is more that incomes have become stagnant<sup>5</sup>. UK groups, that have seen public contributions grow steeply and continuously over the last 20 years, have experienced stagnant or declining incomes.

The bigger concern for NGOs and foundations in many countries (such as the UK and Australia), and for CSOs in poorer countries that derive funding from them, has been the exchange rate variation. This has devalued their grants in countries where prices are linked to the dollar or other stronger currency. From May 2008 to 2009, the UK pound lost 25% of its value against the dollar, and since much of the NGOs' expenditures are linked to the dollar, this represents a major fall in the buying power of UK philanthropy.

In a few cases, poor governance has compounded the financial squeeze, sometimes even fatally damaging NGOs that were thought 'too big to fail', as it has with some banks and large corporations. The most celebrated case is UNICEF Germany (a very well-connected NGO addressing child poverty and education at home and overseas). Bad management of its funds led to economic difficulties and an ensuing scandal, causing the resignation of its CEO and entire board in February 2008. This not only had a severe impact on the charity (with a loss of 30,000 supporters), but also had a severe contagion effect on about half of all German charities (Brookes, 2009). Such experiences have alerted larger NGOs about the need for careful NGO governance and have reminded them about their vulnerability to turmoil in financial markets.

The situation is considerably worse for CSOs in developing countries for three reasons: the economic impact of the crisis has often been deeper; citizens with little spare money (on average) are likely to cut their CSO contributions first; and about one-sixth of CSO income in developing countries comes from overseas funders who, as we have seen, are cutting their grant-making. In South Africa, for example, a major network of NGOs and community organizations reports that their members are feeling an acute pinch, and many NGOs and charities are closing down (Peters, 2008). In Russia, 50% of NGOs

experienced a considerable funding drop (especially in corporate giving); hence, 18% are cutting staff, 26% are cutting salaries, and 18% are delaying salaries.

More direct evidence points to the funding decline from foundations<sup>6</sup>. While the assets of foundations in the USA had doubled to \$682 billion from 1997 to 2007, they shrunk to \$533 billion in the following year—that is, \$150 billion in charitable resources were lost in a single year (Foundation Center, 2009). A further \$50 billion was lost in 2009 and 48% of foundations report budget cuts of 10% or more in 2009 (Council on Foundations, 2009).<sup>7</sup> European foundations may use more conservative investment strategies and so may not have had to reduce grants to the same degree<sup>8</sup>. All, however, are experiencing a decline in revenues while interest rates remain extremely low, and grant-making is tied to foundation earnings.

The one source of civil society funding that has not yet been cut, and is indeed expanding, is OECD governments. Partly due to fiscal stimulus packages which seek to address social needs, among other goals, and partly due to social service and aid ministries considering that they get better value for money by outsourcing to NGOs, there is an increase in governmental funding for many CSO categories, especially those providing public services (whether in health care or fighting corruption). A related concern that grows with state funding, however, is that of state co-option. The CSO programmes are often designed by the government agencies that fund them, rendering the CSOs barely distinguishable from consulting companies.

In summary, there has been a substantial fall in public donations for domestic and international civil society activities; there is likely to be a drop in funding from foundations and other private sector-linked funding sources; and the increased reliance on governmental funding leads to reduced independence of CSOs and an increase in their welfare and service delivery roles.

### *The Challenge of Relevance*

After many years in which the political left was in retreat, the last decade has witnessed a resurgence. Most prominent has been the amorphous ‘anti-globalization’ or ‘alter-globalization’ movement (henceforth called the Movement), characterized by its protest activities at big global events (such as G8, International Monetary Fund (IMF), or World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings) and its annual World Social Forum (WSF). Paradoxically, while the Movement called for systemic change before the financial crisis demonstrated the need for it, in the face of the crisis, it has somewhat withered, rather than grown in strength and stature (Pleyers, 2009). Why?

The main reason is that while the Movement<sup>9</sup> harshly attacks capitalism, it offers no convincing alternative. The reflective CSOs that provided its intellectual leadership did not pinpoint specific threats posed by the sub-prime mortgage market, debt swaps, derivative trading, and the other ingredients of what became the perfect financial storm (to be fair, mainstream financial analysts and journalists failed similarly). The lacuna is due partly to the strong divisions that have become manifest within the Movement (discussed presently) and partly to the attention of civil society being diverted elsewhere.

The crisis has revealed, specifically, the degree to which most CSOs had ignored financial regulation, the banking sector, and governance of the *private* sector. Over the last 20 years, plenty of CSOs have become exceedingly skilled in matters related to the governance of national and sub-national governments and international organizations. The author

has been involved in both sides of civil society efforts to effect change in intergovernmental institutions<sup>10</sup>. While there are many anti-capitalist groups and business-focused campaigns,<sup>11</sup> there are few effective CSO endeavours to reform the governance of the private sector, in general, or fix today's economic crisis.<sup>12</sup>

Organizations like the IMF and World Bank have proved to be more popular targets than commercial banks and easier to get the necessary information about an effective campaign. Whatever be the reasons, while mass protests abound about governments' *response* to the financial crisis (such as the riots against raising student fees in the UK or the retirement age in France), there has been a relative dearth of civic activism on the current credit crunch itself<sup>13</sup>, just when public fury with the finance sector is at its peak.

While bankers' bonuses, the fragility of the global economic system, the ethics of speculation, etc. have been roundly decried by CSO activists, no coherent and common set of prescriptions is presented as an alternative to the current *laissez faire* global economic management. The Movement easily identifies systemic faults, but its mode of operation (largely web based, meeting occasionally in large and amorphous gatherings, eschewing strong leadership) prevents clear messages about the alternatives advocated—other than the vague sentiment that 'another world is possible' (Clark & Themudo, 2006).

The most insightful analysis of the decline of the Movement is offered by Pleyer (2009). He suggests that the clearest sign of this was its failure to mobilize a significant presence at the WTO meeting in Geneva in July 2008—given that this was in many ways a make-or-break meeting for the WTO. Nate Cull (2009), a WSF participant from New Zealand, similarly notes that the 2009 forum was less well attended than previous ones and 'more chaotic and less well organized than Porto Alegre 2005'<sup>14</sup>. It has also become much more polarized towards Latin American participants.

Overall, therefore, the economic crisis has paradoxically not helped the CSOs that most vociferously condemn international finance and neo-liberalism. Pleyer (2009) describes this as the 'failure of success' and that the Movement has achieved a victory, since even the defenders of the old order are now also calling for systemic change to curb 'casino capitalism'. While true in part, the Movement's inherent weaknesses and contradictions have become more evident; in particular, internal divisions have spurred its withering.

### *Divisions in Activism*

The Movement's zenith was the 'Battle of Seattle' of 30 November 1999, triggered by the protests at the WTO meeting, and the subsequent six years in which the WSF grew in strength<sup>15</sup>. But its diversity and dependence on information technology were weaknesses as well as strengths. In being a collection of only loosely related causes (in effect, a 'Protest Mall', not a campaign), being mediated mostly via web-based communication, and being culturally hostile to strong leadership, it has been united more by what it is *against* rather than by what it stands *for*, resulting inevitably in tensions and divisions.<sup>16</sup>

These divisions have been widened by the current economic crisis. Some observers of the WSF have written of its bifurcation into a periodic mass encounter for social movement activists, on the one hand, and an 'organized network of experts, academics and NGO practitioners', on the other hand, who seek to 're-establish the role of professional revolutionaries' (Barchiesi, *et al.*, 2006).

Pleyers (2009) laments the Movement's weakness just as the opportunity presents itself for 'building a new and fair global order'. Drawing on his analysis, it appears that three incompatible currents are discernable:

- *The 'Localists'* who want a global network to share experiences on building communities' local autonomy via participatory self-government as the true alternative to corporate globalization—such as through 'collective purchase groups' and even creating alternative, local currencies.
- *The 'Advocates'* who promote specific-issue campaigns and who regard the WSF and the broader movement both as vehicles for their causes and as a meeting point to share experience, give mutual support, and perhaps raise broader questions that are common to the multitude of campaigns.
- *The 'Statists'* who see populist, leftist governments, such as Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Bolivia's Evo Morales, as beacons for a new way.

One can add a fourth group—the 'anarchists'—who are cynical of the advocates and statist, but who are keener to attack the current global system than to work for local alternatives.

The incompatibility of these groupings weakens the Movement's body politic, but it is the nature of the current crisis that has so starkly exposed this weakness. The perfidious universality of the credit crunch's impact renders dependence on local solutions implausible and makes the piecemeal prescriptions of the advocates seem inadequate. It is not the populist governments that are spearheading solutions to the crisis but centrist governments of rich countries, and the solutions that are supported by most citizens (except the most conservative) require stronger governments, not anarchy.

### *Economic Crisis—a Triple Blow for Civil Society*

As we have seen, the credit crunch has been difficult for civil society and has impacted its agency in three ways. It has made a *financial hit*—significantly denting CSOs' income, especially in developing countries. It has posed a *challenge of relevance*—paradoxically contributing to a weakening of the very social movement that most vociferously criticized the ailing global financial system, since it has been unable to galvanize unity around solutions to the crisis. And it has led to *divisions in activism*—as current events have exposed and deepened the tensions and divisions in the leadership of the Movement.

### **Impact of the 'War on Terror'**

As then-President Bush and his allies prepared for war in Iraq, CSOs and social movements mobilized record-breaking numbers onto the streets. The protests of 15 February, 2003, involving tens of millions of people in about 800 cities around the world, is listed in the Guinness Book of Records as the largest ever protest<sup>17</sup>. *New York Times* writer, Tyler (2003), stated that the protests showed that there were two superpowers on the planet, the USA and worldwide public opinion.

For a while, this reinvigorated radical elements in civil society, but as the war effort moved forward undaunted, the demonstrations grew thinner—even though public opinion against the Iraq war hardened. Paradoxically, as the public thirst for ending the

war grew, mass activism shifted back to other focuses, such as (in the USA) opposing tax increases. Why? It might be that once the war started, it appeared unpatriotic, or a lost cause, to campaign against it or that this would appear disrespectful to the families of fallen soldiers. Those against the war were also deeply divided about the strategies both for ending the war and for fighting terrorism. These and other factors eroded the public appeal of the anti-war cause.

The 'war on terror', then, has been a roller-coaster for social movements and radical CSOs and has had two other major impacts. It has increased public scepticism of faith-based CSOs. And authorities have intervened more intrusively in the affairs of CSOs in their anti-terrorism strategies or in copy-cat measures on the part of regimes hostile to civil society. Both these phenomena represent serious backward steps for civil society.

### *Losing Faith in Faiths*

During the Cold War, faith was a significant factor in framing the ideological debate, especially in America where Christians projected a sense of moral superiority towards the 'godless atheism' of Marxism. This religious factor was unidirectional in strengthening anti-communist sentiments. Within the Soviet Union, adherence to atheism was not itself a rallying point, and hence the religious divide did not add directly to the flashpoints.

Today, the ideological fault lines are different, and religion is a primary source of tension. For both sets of protagonists, the religion and culture of the other is *a* (if not *the*) source of tension, and many have become mistrustful of religion itself, viewing it as a perennial source of social conflict, repression, and violence. Militant Islam has replaced the Soviet Union in the eyes of most Westerners (especially Americans) as the chief threat to their values and way of life, and militant extremism is widely seen as inherent in the Muslim faith. Evangelicals (46%), mainline Protestants (45%), and Jews (43%) are the most likely Americans to assert that Islam encourages violence more than other religions (Smidt, 2005). The same groups (excepting the Jewish community and black Protestants) were the support base for the US invasion of Iraq. This distrust of Islam is not restricted to the USA. A multi-country survey for the BBC (Pew Research Center, 2006) showed that about 60% people in Spain, 52% in Germany, 41% in France, and 32% in Britain associate Islam with violence.

Unlike in the Cold War, religion has become *the* pivotal contested area. Northern citizens (especially those in the USA) regard Islam, and not just *militant* Islam, as a major threat. This has been powerfully illustrated by the vehement and widespread opposition mounted against plans by a group of leading Muslims to build a mosque and inter-faith community centre (the Cordoba House project<sup>18</sup>) close to Ground Zero in New York<sup>19</sup>. Similar protests have sought to block the building of mosques elsewhere in the USA (including Staten Island, New York; Temecula Valley, California; and Sheboygan, Wisconsin)<sup>20</sup>. In parallel, attitudes of Muslims have become very negative towards the West. Hence, in Muslim countries, some 68% of respondents to the BBC poll regarded Westerners as violent, 77% as selfish, and 52% as fanatic.

Such findings give credence to pundits who claim that today's schism reflects a 'clash of civilizations' rooted in different value systems.<sup>21</sup> Religion is increasingly a source of conflict and divisions, not of harmony and understanding. A 2005 survey concluded that three-quarters of the US public consider that religion has either a great deal (40%) or a fair amount (35%) to do with most wars and conflicts in the world today<sup>22</sup>. Similarly,

an Ipsos MORI poll revealed that 60% of British people consider religion now to be a more significant source of division than race. This helps explain the decline in religious affiliation in much of the world. While majorities still describe themselves as believers in the UK, 83% of the population is now not involved in any regular religious practice.<sup>23</sup> Faith-based groups in many countries are, consequently, losing their power to contribute to social cohesion and conflict resolution.

### *Tightening the Reins*

Potentially, the most damaging indirect impact of the ‘war on terror’ on civil society stems from the heightened governmental scrutiny and restrictions CSOs are subjected to. This started soon after the 9/11 attacks when senior officials from largely OECD countries came together to discuss concerted action to fight terrorist cells by identifying and cutting off their funding. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money-Laundering and Counter-Terrorism was set up in 1989 and comprises officials from 34 countries representing finance ministries, central banks, intelligence agencies, police, and other departments. In October 2001, the FATF’s original money-laundering mandate was expanded to ‘incorporate efforts to combat terrorist financing’.<sup>24</sup>

At its first meeting with this wider mandate, FATF drew up ‘8 Special Recommendations ... on Terrorist Financing’.<sup>25</sup> The first seven of these were unexceptional and largely re-stated and nuanced existing measures against money-laundering. Special Recommendation 8 (SR8) was new, however, and related to ‘non-profit organizations’ (NPOs). Though illegal British forces’ causes have long been financed through philanthropies (Jonsson & Cornell, 2007), including, for example, Irish-American groups funding the Irish Republican Army to fight in Northern Ireland, finance for ETA (the Basque separatist movement), and President Suharto’s use of family foundations to secrete large fortunes out of Indonesia, internationally coordinated action related to CSOs had never been agreed before. In the face of Al Qaeda, however, all that was to change.

FATF asserted that there was considerable proof that NPOs had on many occasions supported terrorism in one of four ways: by raising funds, making illegal transfers, giving direct logistical support, or serving as a cover for terrorist operations (Financial Action Task Force [FATF], 2004). In practice, the only evidence made public was either too vague to be scrutinized or consisted of hearsay. Nevertheless, FATF alleges that the problem is so great that misuse of NPOs by terrorists ‘not only facilitates terrorist activity but also undermines donor confidence and jeopardizes the very integrity of NPOs’—a sweeping statement, given that it relates to the whole sector. In SR8, it, therefore, called on all governments to ‘review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can be abused for the financing of terrorism’ and complained that ‘NPOs may often be subject to little or no governmental oversight (for example, registration, record keeping, reporting and monitoring), or few formalities may be required for their creation’<sup>26</sup>—implying that this is a matter of grave concern, even though no evidence is given to suggest that NPOs are more prone to terrorist links than are businesses.

Scrutinizing SR8 reveals FATF’s meagre understanding of civil society. It defines an NPO as ‘a legal entity or organization that primarily engages in raising or disbursing funds for purposes such as charitable, religious, cultural, educational, social or fraternal purposes, or for the carrying out of other types of “good works”’<sup>27</sup>. This limits the focus to *legally registered* NPOs. In many countries, it is common for NPOs not to be

legal persons (even if they may have a bank account); indeed, it is often only required in the case of organizations that seek tax relief or other state benefits.

The lack of analysis behind FATF recommendations is illustrated by its advice regarding government scrutiny of NPO overseas funding. It argues for particular scrutiny of 'NPOs which account for (1) a significant portion of the financial resources under control of the sector; and (2) a substantial share of the sector's international activities.' The implication is that the largest charities are the greatest threat and that the smallest ones can be ignored. The reverse is more likely; in the UK, terrorism is more likely to be financed by small outfits that are not registered charities but are linked to radical Islamic groups than by the National Trust or Red Cross.

FATF goes on to prescribe a series of actions<sup>28</sup> which have proved extremely burdensome to CSOs. It calls on governments to (a) require all NPOs to thoroughly know their partners and those they fund overseas; (b) review the legal and reporting requirements of NPOs; and (c) strengthen government supervision and monitoring of NPOs. It advises governments to consider 'reversing the burden of proof' by requiring NPOs to *prove* that 'their overseas operations ... are conducted in accordance with their stated purpose and by-laws.'

In the USA, the requirement of NGOs and foundations to know their partners and fundees has been made a legal requirement which renders the trustees (or board members) criminally liable for any misuse of the organizations' funds in activities that could be construed as linked to terrorists.<sup>29</sup> A seasoned expert on NGO legislation, Baron (2004), described these new provisions as risking 'setting potentially unachievable due diligence requirements for international grant-making, [and] subjecting international grant-makers to high but largely undefined levels of legal risk'. The effect of such actions has been to deter many organizations from making any overseas grants (especially those for which this was not a major purpose of their organization) (Sidel, 2006). US NGOs have campaigned against the government's approach not only because it implies that the non-profit sector is a problem rather than an important bulwark against terrorism, but also because it implies 'that charitable organizations are agents of the government' (Council on Foundations, 2006).

Such problems are not restricted to the USA. In Canada, legislation introduced in 2004 renders a charity susceptible to criminal charges if it even unwittingly facilitates or supports terrorist activities. This could result in the charity losing its charitable status and the corresponding exposure of its directors to personal, criminal liability (Weber, 2008). And in the UK, the main umbrella of philanthropies, the National Council of Voluntary Organisations (NCVO), considers that UK counter-terrorism measures have deterred legitimate NGO activities in ways that 'have had a negative impact on CSOs, particularly those working with Muslim communities and/or in areas where the threat of terrorism is high' (Quigley & Pratten, 2007). NCVO calls these measures 'heavy handed ... they have tended to assume that because a small number of charities have been implicated in investigations into terrorist activity, all charitable organisations are at risk' (Quigley & Pratten, 2007).

In light of concerns about NGOs being used to finance terrorist activities, reporting requirements have been made much stiffer and onerous for NGOs in a number of countries. In the USA, the 990 form (that the Internal Revenue Service requires all registered NPOs to submit each year) has expanded from 6 pages in 2000 to about 35 pages for a medium to large NGO at present. This amounts to a severe burden for all but the largest

NGOs, and the additional scrutiny required is a deterrent to overseas activities and grants in particular.<sup>30</sup>

Given that support for Islamic organizations and causes in Muslim countries generally is particularly scrutinized, these measures have had a perverse consequence. While Muslim anger generated by the ‘war on terror’ has fuelled international ‘solidarity’, funding for mosque-based and anti-Western movements, the increased difficulties philanthropies in rich countries experience in financing activities in Muslim countries have resulted in a significant decrease in support (Quigley & Pratten, 2007, p. 13). Given that the latter typically supports social, charitable, and inter-faith activities, CSO funding from rich countries to Muslim civil society has, in effect, gravitated from secular to Islamic causes, so heightening religious divisions.

Paradoxically, just when world security demands greater harmony between people of different faiths and cultures and when the West needs to improve its image in Muslim countries, the over-reaction of rich countries in the name of counter-terrorism risks doing the opposite.<sup>31</sup> Though efforts to track the financing of terrorism are very important (whether via CSOs, businesses, or states), by stigmatizing charities as part of the terrorist *problem*, many people of goodwill throughout the world have become alienated. Western-funded groups are also increasingly criticized by nationalists as suspect.

According to Weber (2008, p. 8), many American foundations, in particular, now avoid direct funding of local Muslim NPOs by supporting ‘Friends of’ organizations and big international humanitarian organizations. He suggests a ‘double negative outcome of this approach’, namely less efficient philanthropy due to the suspicions of Muslim populations towards Western organizations and ‘holding back the development of a strong and pluralist third sector in countries where it is more likely needed’.

As noted above, FATF alleges (though presents no evidence for) a grave problem that ‘NPOs may often be subject to little or no governmental oversight (for example, registration, record keeping, reporting and monitoring), or few formalities may be required for their creation’. This assumes that NPOs *ought* to report to and be monitored by governments, which runs counter to the notion that civil society should be independent of the state. The deepening concern of CSOs around the world is the degree to which FATF-inspired actions conflict with one of the basic and internationally certified human rights, namely the right of association, as defined in Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This article makes clear that the only government interference with the right of association should stem from matters of national security or other overwhelming imperatives. There appears to have been no discussion within FATF about how to safeguard this. Hence, we find that the actions taken, in practice, result in a major compromise of associational rights.

The commonest restrictions that have been introduced by governments in recent years are:

- *Restrictions on the right to exist at all in a meaningful way*: for example, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Cuba, China, and Vietnam.
- *Restrictions on the right to register or form CSOs*: for example, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, and Algeria.
- *Restrictions on the right to hold gatherings*: for example, Belarus.
- *Restrictions on the right to receive foreign funding without prior approval*: for example, Eritrea, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe.
- *Arbitrary termination/dissolution of CSOs*: for example, Belarus and Egypt.

- *Arbitrary and stringent oversight and control of CSOs*: for example, Turkey and Belarus.
- *Imposing criminal penalties against individual officers*: for example, Egypt.

While few of these restrictions directly stem from anti-terrorism, this context has been used by many governments to outlaw and establish a stricter control over both national and international NPOs for political reasons rather than for security ones (Sidel, 2006). Some governments have always been suspicious of independent civil society, even if they warily permit its continued existence (perhaps only as a sop to rich countries whose aid they want). They now see greater common ground with Western governments in their suspicion of CSOs and are taking advantage of this current climate to increase restrictions on civil society Howell *et al.* (2006)

In the decades up to 2001, there was a gradual expansion of associational freedom and other civil and political rights, but there has been a reversal since then. According to Sidel (2006), in the first five years after 9/11, various forms of anti-terrorism regulations have affected or threatened to affect the third sector in a wide range of nations including Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Central Asia, China, India, The Netherlands, Pakistan, UK, USA, and Zimbabwe. This pattern continues. A specialist NGO that monitors and provides advice on association law (the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ICNL) identifies more than 24 laws that have been introduced or enacted from 2008 until mid-2009 that restrict the legal space for civil society.<sup>32</sup>

One increasingly common measure is to require NGOs to channel their funding ‘*through explicitly authorized and monitored local organizations*’. This is usually interpreted to mean a quango or state-authorized NGO umbrella that ensures that foreign funding is only made available to government-approved activities.

The increased state interference with CSO freedoms has led the United Nations Human Rights Council to agree, in 2010, to appoint a new Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.

### **Impact of the Climate Change Debate on Civil Society**

No field has historically been more influenced by civil society than the environment. Until recently, the major environment groups, rather than governments, have shaped public opinion, dominated the media, and provided leadership in policy-making—and governments and the scientific establishment have lagged behind. There are signs that this is now changing for three reasons. First, governments in the USA, Europe, and elsewhere are keen to seize issue leadership; second, a new breed of climate-sceptic CSO has emerged—comprising largely right-wing politicians, business interests, and conspiracy theorists—which has muddied the public debate; and third, CSOs have often been linked to exaggerated claims and polarized positions, from which policy-makers and climate scientists are increasingly keen to distance themselves. These factors are discussed, in turn, before asking how long lasting the present loss of favour might be and what strategies CSOs might adopt to counter them.

#### *The Problem of Success*

When climate change was a relatively new subject in the public eye,<sup>33</sup> the media would draw on the best-known environment groups—such as Greenpeace, Friends of the

Earth (FoE), or Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF)—for evidence and policy sound bites. As climate change became more widely accepted, leading politicians have tended to assume the limelight. Hence, when the media carries a climate change story, now its interviewee is likely to be governmental rather than non-governmental, unless the story concerns a particularly strident or eye-catching piece of action. Having succeeded in getting politicians to take the issue seriously, NGOs are now less prominent on the issue.

Pressure groups can flag a new concern, educate citizens, mobilize people to demonstrate public interest, and lobby legislators, but once an issue becomes a priority, politicians and the media look to other sources for their ammunition. In this case, the main source of policy expertise is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its various Working Groups<sup>34</sup>. Many governments (especially those of richer countries) have also appointed their own expert advisory groups. The more articulate scientists are also most likely to be the media's interviewees of choice. NGO leaders who continue to be prominent in the public debate are often those (such as Jonathan Porritt in the UK, former director of FoE) who have been appointed as government advisors.

Out of the first 120 entries in a Google search on 'climate change', 49 were government or intergovernmental sources, 21 were civil society (including two climate change sceptics), 23 were media, 20 were scientific or educational, three were business, and four were private blogs. Though this is purely illustrative, it suggests that fewer web users are drawing on CSO sources than would have been the case in the 1990s. Moreover, less than half of these 21 CSO entries belonged to mainstream groups (such as Worldwide Fund for Nature, Greenpeace, FoE, Nature Conservancy, Oxfam, and the Catholic Church) that played a crucial role in bringing the issue to global prominence. The majority are groups that may have little history on the issue but adopt much higher profile or controversial campaigning or are well connected with the media, including Climate Change Camp, Climate Ark, Campaign against Climate Change, the Al Gore Foundation, and David Suzuki Foundation.

### *The Fight-Back by Climate Change Sceptics*

At the same time, business interests have retaliated against the mounting consensus for emission curbs. One strategy of the 'climate sceptic' lobby has been to adopt civil society campaigning tactics itself. Several groups, whose names often suggest they are academic centres (such as Global Warming Policy Foundation, Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change, and International Climate Conference), have emerged in the last few years specifically to arrest the momentum towards action on climate change. Their strategies are to publicize any evidence or authority that appears to run counter to the scientific consensus, to impugn the motives or integrity of those who call for reducing emissions, and to claim that the measures so advocated would be ruinously expensive. Some who speak against a major action to reduce emissions (such as the Copenhagen Consensus Center) accept that there is a greenhouse effect, but argue that it is too costly to address today and that the immediate priority should be on helping vulnerable communities adapt to a hotter climate and higher sea levels, postponing for decades or centuries policies to reduce emissions (Lomborg, 2007; Copenhagen Consensus Center, 2009).

The most prominent climate-sceptic groups that are registered as NGOs or think tanks are generally reticent about their funding sources. Those who have researched this issue have found that much, if not most, funding derives from the energy industry.<sup>35</sup> The oil and gas industry has greatly increased its budget for lobbying overall as the climate debate has become more prominent, dwarfing the equivalent expenditures of environmentalists.<sup>36</sup>

A key strategy of climate-sceptic CSOs is to argue that scientists are deeply divided over the evidence for climate change. While there is indeed an active debate, this tends to focus on the rate of acceleration of climate change, the role of water vapour, the sink-effect of oceans and other environmental variables, and technical issues. Most climate scientists (84% in the USA) now agree that human activities are causing climate changes which are extremely serious and demand urgent action, and only 5% believe that that human activity does not contribute to greenhouse warming.<sup>37</sup>

Climate sceptics, however, continue to proclaim that scientists do not agree. Hence, the letter from Wolfgang Müller (2009) (Executive Director of the Institute for Free Enterprise) inviting participants to the International Climate Conference, hosted by the Institute, says that 'the real science and economics of climate change support the view that global warming is not a crisis and that immediate action to reduce emissions is not necessary. This is, in fact, the emerging consensus view of scientists outside the IPCC and most economists outside environmental advocacy groups.' The Heartland Institute makes similar claims and has erroneously listed scientists who support such views, refusing to delete these names when the scientists concerned protested.<sup>38</sup>

Conservative think tanks are constantly on the lookout for scientists who express doubts about climate change, sometimes offering them financial inducements to do so.<sup>39</sup> When they do find academics who are climate change sceptics, they widely publicize their views and provide them with public platforms. While most are economists and non-scientists, some *are* scientists, and some (very few) are even climate scientists who buck the strong consensus in their community recognizing anthropogenic climate change.<sup>40</sup> Such sources are used by these groups to contradict and pour confusion over global warming.<sup>41</sup>

More mischievously, some activists have obtained documents by hacking into private email accounts of climate scientists and scientific units to search out any illustration of practices that are less than perfect or conclusions that are dented. In particular, hacked emails from Professor Phil Jones of the Climate Research Unit, a think tank housed at the University of East Anglia, have been used in a campaign to imply that IPCC climate scientists are routinely exaggerating the climate change issue.<sup>42</sup>

Helped by the right-wing press, such dissembling has been chillingly successful. Public opinion surveys in the USA and elsewhere demonstrate a dwindling public conviction about the science of climate change at the same time that scientists have become more convinced.<sup>43</sup>

### *The Environment Lobby: Shadows of Doubt*

In the face of this increasingly aggressive fight-back and mounting public confusion over the issue, CSOs that are concerned about climate change face a dilemma. On the one hand, policy action costing huge sums of money and globally concerted responses requires both confidence that there are no cheaper alternatives and massive public support for that

action. On the other hand, the case that the emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> and other gasses cause anthropogenic climate change is based on climate science that depends on a large number of variables and can only approximate *probabilities* that certain levels of emission will result in particular increases in mean global temperature.

Cautious language about the percentage probability that global temperatures will rise by 3°C rather than by 2°C in timescales of several decades does not motivate public opinion. Most campaigning environmental groups, therefore, make statements that are bolder, relegating the detailed analysis to footnotes—resulting in a tone of precision and certainty that climate scientists eschew. Greenpeace, for example, says that because the Copenhagen conference failed to agree to a 40% cut in emissions, ‘we are on track for more than 3°C temperature rise’. FoE predicts that without abating emissions, there will be ‘much greater temperature rises—even up to 7°C ... Mountain glaciers may almost entirely vanish this century’. Oxfam argues that the failure of Copenhagen might have put ‘the world on track for a catastrophic temperature rise of almost 4°C’. And even the more cautious WWF says that ‘global emissions need to be at 44 giga-tons of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent [i.e. 2005 levels] or lower, by 2020 if the world is to have a better than 50% chance of staying below 2°C warming. ... [the world could] be locked in to warming of 3 or 4°C or more. The consequences for people and nature on Planet Earth would be catastrophic.’<sup>44</sup>

While these statements may well be proved true, and there is science behind them, they are couched in more alarmist and confident language than climate scientists typically use—especially as the climate sceptics have so successfully used advocacy and media strategies to magnify doubts about every scintilla of evidence.

Hence, while scientists and policy-makers once had much closer links with environment groups, now there is a cautious distance. The recent controversy about the melting of Himalayan glaciers has deepened this divide. A 938-page IPCC report, released in 2007, carelessly included a short statement warning of the likelihood of these glaciers ‘disappearing by the year 2035 and perhaps sooner’. This passage was not based on the IPCC’s peer review process, but on a scientific paper included in an annex. This has damaged the credibility of the IPCC. Embarrassingly, the author of the paper and this wild claim was WWF-Nepal. IPCC and climate scientists will inevitably be more cautious with evidence from NGOs in the future.<sup>45</sup>

### *Conclusions on the Climate Debate*

As we have discussed, although the consensus among scientists of anthropogenic climate change and the need to take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are stronger than ever, and although civil society can be credited with awakening the world to the urgency of this issue, the current juncture is more hostile to the very organizations that have elevated the issue. Politicians now want to make the running, not NGOs. Meanwhile, aggressive tactics by oil industry lobbyists and conservative pressure groups have poured doubt on the case and raised doubt among the general public.

It is unfortunate that the two most prominent incidences clouding the reputation of climate science are linked to CSOs. IPCC’s erroneous reference to the rapid melting of Himalayan glaciers comes from WWF and the ‘climate-gate scandal’, alleging bias and distortion in the use of scientific data, originates in hacked emails from the UK think tank, the Climate Research Unit. Scientists, having been burnt as a result of a few careless statements, are asserting their objectivity by distancing themselves from CSOs.

While even most oil companies recognize that there is a problem, and indeed that there is a need to act, the debate has turned to one of *how* to act. The sceptics call for very limited measures (in particular, *adapting* to climate change, rather than trying to avoid it), while the environment lobby urges sweeping and global measures. NGOs typically are better at the headlines than at the detail. This is not to say that leading environment groups do not have rigorous analysis and sound recommendations. Indeed, they do. However, they face a dilemma. If they make bold claims and call for dramatic action, their supporters are moved, and the media report their case—but they risk being labelled ‘alarmist’, which tarnishes their image among policy-makers and scientists. On the other hand, if they draw fully on the research and set out a rigorous case, they quickly lose their audience and lose ground to the newer, smaller pressure groups that have fewer scruples.

Further civil society divisions relate to policy prescriptions. Some CSOs call for reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by reducing energy consumption, such as by high taxes on air travel and petroleum products. Others see this as unrealistic and call for increasing renewable energy production, but ‘green energy’ initiatives (such as wind farms, hydro-electric dams, and wave barrages) are often criticized by local civic groups. Some NGO leaders (even those who were previously vocally opposed) have become advocates for returning to nuclear fuel, but this remains deeply divisive. Some NGOs recognize that, in reality, fossil fuels will continue to predominate for many years to come and so argue for carbon sequestration and other technological fixes that reduce or delay the greenhouse effect<sup>46</sup>. These, in turn, are condemned by other NGOs to whom coal and oil are anathemas. Likewise, some organizations have pressed for climate change mitigation measures (especially for island and low-lying states), while others consider this defeatist, since it assumes that global warming will continue. And, of course, civil society voices on the environment are far from limited to environment groups. In many countries (particularly the USA and UK), some of the largest public protests in recent years have been organized by the drivers’ lobbies against taxes on fuels. While civil society has put this issue on the agenda, it is difficult to think of another topic that has been more divisive.

Finally, it is important to stress that while this section has stressed the difficulties, not all is gloomy in the civil society camp. TckTckTck is a widely supported campaign launched by a coalition of development, environment, human rights, religious, and other groups, including household names such as Oxfam, Amnesty, and WWF. Its petition for a fair, ambitious, and binding climate change agreement, launched 100 days before the Copenhagen summit, mustered 15 million signatures. And the largely web-mediated 350 Organization (which presses for a global commitment to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions to 350ppm) organized a ‘planetary day of action’ on 24 October 2009 that comprised 5281 actions in iconic places in 181 countries around the world; this was described by CNN as the ‘most widespread day of political action in history’.

There are also a myriad of scattered actions that emphasize personal responsibility and community-level action. Hence, a FoE survey in the UK concluded that there are some 2–4000 community-based groups working on climate change in the UK and that this number is growing rapidly (indeed some 40% of these groups were set up since 2005), but the survey also showed that 59% of these are independent, not affiliated to any national group, and a further 8% are affiliated to faith organizations. Hence, relatively few are part of a national environmental campaigning movement.

## Conclusions

As discussed above, the major twenty-first-century crises have reduced citizen support for CSOs, reduced the influence of civil society as a corrective force, triggered a renaissance of the ‘state as saviour’ (as opposed to civil society solutions), and exacerbated tensions both between the state and civil society and within civil society.

While the 1980s and 1990s were periods in which governments were in ideological retreat (with the private sector and, to some extent, civil society enjoying a parallel ascendancy), today’s nexus of crises is perfect territory for governments, since only they are able to tackle them. While civil society remains important, it finds itself overshadowed today by state actors. As a consequence, public support for transformational CSOs has dropped steeply in recent years (as evidenced, for example, by declining membership of the major environment NGOs, or participation in the WSF, or numbers protesting at the main meetings of global leaders).

Many governments have become more hostile to civil society in response to protests about their handling of the Iraq war and their negligence in addressing the social impact of the financial crisis. As a consequence, they have become less receptive to CSOs. Governments elsewhere in the world have often latched onto this changed mood as a pretext for reverting to a more repressive environment for their domestic civil society.

CSOs have often responded either by remaining silent or by becoming shriller in their criticism of governments. This spiral of mistrust and antagonism is counterproductive for both sides. It leads to the further marginalization of civil society, but more importantly, it distracts and deters governments from the path the world needs them to follow.

Today’s crises can only be effectively tackled by governments and—moreover—by governments acting collectively. This requires governments that are both strong and confident. Governments that feel vulnerable look inwards; they look to measures that give them most chance of clinging to power—that is, matters that are short term and local, whereas the critical fixes that are needed are long term and global. Only governments that feel strong and relatively safe on their home front are prepared to make the compromises needed for international cooperation. Strong opposition, whether from political adversaries or social movements, is likely to make them feel vulnerable.

Herein lies the dilemma for civil society. Public pressure on issues of global public concern needs to be strong enough to ensure that governments are resolute in addressing them. But CSOs also need to assure governments that they can provide practical help and deliver public support for the necessary government action—that is, that they are not anti-government *per se*. The challenge for CSOs is how to press for resolute action without further eroding public trust in governments and, indeed, how to foster government leadership tomorrow on the very issues that governments are castigated for ignoring today. This requires different strategies to those normally deployed—namely the exaggeration of official errors and demonstrating overwhelming public disgust for these sins.

What this means, in practice, is more civil society attention directed towards the *processes*, rather than towards the *substance*, of politics and especially to matters of governance. CSOs can help elected representatives in their oversight of government practices related to global challenges and can respond to and even create opportunities for direct citizen participation in the affairs of governments at local, national, and global levels. Such measures will encourage governments to put into practice the rhetoric of their

stated policies and will provide feedback on the degree to which this is achieved and the efficacy of those measures.<sup>47</sup>

Civic engagement is particularly pertinent to today's global crises. These require much greater participation by citizens and non-governmental experts in the making and execution of policy and in rigorous oversight of government performance. Many CSO networks are now cooperating internationally to promote such participation. They have often seen the need to get out of their 'issue silos' (whether related to the environment, gender, arms trade, third world debt, or whatever) to focus on broader concerns of global governance. Examples include the International Association of NGOs (bringing together the major development, human rights, and environment NGOs on trans-sectoral campaigns) or the 'TckTckTck' alliance on climate change and social development.

What such networks have in common is the view that policy actions needed to address global crises are often relatively clear, but there is inertia in reaching them throughout the world, and that, therefore, what is needed is civic action to change the *zeitgeist* from 'political won't' to 'political will' (Malena, 2010).

While the single-issue focus has clearly been effective, it also has increasingly clear downfalls: (a) it tends to atomize politics into countless causes that politicians find difficult to reconcile; (b) activists tend to concentrate on international and perhaps US decision-makers in ways that ignore national governments and parliamentarians; and (c) the causes tend to be somewhat elitist (just a few faces keep surfacing and only the elite media follow them). An unfortunate side-effect is that it often makes people more cynical about their national democratic processes—which can be counterproductive. Connecting citizens and the state in ways that are productive and constructive while safeguarding CSO autonomy is not easy to achieve at a time when civil society itself is under threat. But at present the sector feels squeezed by 'managed democracies' and authoritarian regimes alike as they impose increasingly tough restrictions on CSOs, and at the same time, a few examples of NGO errors or exaggerations are widely cited to impugn the integrity and competence of NGOs in general.

Historically, civil society, like democracy, has been built from the local level upwards. Citizens form local action groups and share experiences with counterparts in neighbouring communities, perhaps networking at the regional or national level. Modern technology is changing the geography of politics. It is no longer necessary just to be grouped together according to the communities where we live. Through participatory democracy, we can aggregate by *communities of interest* which can be global as readily as local. The resulting *global policy networks* have engaged effectively with the institutions of global governance (the UN, World Bank, WTO, G8, etc.) and with journalists in their coverage of world affairs. Policy shifts and citizen oversight may be easier to attain at the local or national level (where political power resides and most decisions are made), but through such networking, civil society has achieved a role in governance at the international level—where traditional instruments of oversight (such as the monitoring departments of governments and elected representatives) are very weak, but where critical agreements are forged on environmental and economic matters.

Indeed, in order to remain relevant in today's policy arena, civil society must demonstrate its ability to contribute effective responses to today's major crises, rather than just putting issues on the public agenda. In other words, it must point to solutions, not just identify problems. The trends discussed in this article make it difficult to do this. While these difficulties remain minor tremors for the sector rather than seismic shifts,

they are the ones that civil society leaders should reflect on carefully because they may become more troublesome in the future and because they warrant some shifts in tactics. In particular, there is a case for more strenuously seeking influential allies in governments and official bodies, for focusing more on the *process* of policy-making (i.e. governance), rather than on its substance, for searching out non-traditional allies, such as activist shareholders or scientists, for forging new allies within civil society (such as NGOs partnering with professional associations or faith leaders), and for looking for good models of ‘co-governance’ involving both state and civic actors, as illustrated most effectively in Nordic countries (see Trägårdh, 2007).

Given the relatively high degree of consensus today about what crises need to be addressed and the approximate direction policy needs to take, the key areas of contention concern the exact strategies to take and the sequence and burden-sharing of these actions. This territory has not traditionally been the comparative advantage of CSOs, but must become so if civil society is to pull its weight. The key challenge for CSOs is to demonstrate that they can indeed contribute in such areas while at the same time not losing the interest and support of their adherents.

To adapt in this way would prove most difficult especially for the many activists who provide leadership of the anti-globalization movement. For them, the *modus operandi* has been to scorn Western governments and caricature them as offering undiluted capitalist dogma as the solution to all problems. At the same time, the diverse groups focus on a myriad set of issues ranging from children’s play to workers’ pay—presenting even more diverse and often idiosyncratic solutions to the problems highlighted. They present a semblance of unity in rejecting *this* type of globalization and seeking an alternative.

Their slogan has been ‘One big “NO!” and many small “YESSSES”’. This was appealing for a while, but in the face of the three major global crises discussed, it has evidently palled, as revealed by the diminishing scale of the Movement’s events and protests. Mass movements may be effective at registering concerns (the concerted ‘NO’), but once on the political agenda, the contest of ideas and leadership requires convincing alternatives to policies being pursued. A multitude of small ‘YESSSES’ is not convincing to policy-makers and neither does it sustain the public’s motivation, especially as those solutions are often untested or poorly thought out (they become a handful of ‘MAYBES’).

The challenge for civil society today is to demonstrate not that it can see more clearly the problems of today’s globalization but that it can pinpoint most compellingly the fairest and most effective solutions to those problems and that it can play a vital role in ensuring that governments at all levels do what they must to achieve those solutions. What is needed is a clear, broadly agreed, and convincing YES to match each of civil society’s proclaimed NO.

## Notes

1. A modified version of this essay is appearing as a chapter in a forthcoming book: *Civil Society in the Age of WikiLeaks: Challenges to Monitor Democracy*, edited by Lars Trägårdh and Nina Witoszek with Bron Taylor, Berghahn Books, New York, USA. The first draft was presented as a paper at the September 2009 workshop in the CERES21 (Creative Responses to Sustainability) series, organized by the Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, and held at Instituto Europeo in Florence.
2. A global survey of citizens’ concerns confirms these to be the three highest public concerns. The 2005 GlobeSpan ‘Global Issues Monitor’ survey in 22 countries asked respondents to rank what they regard as ‘the most important problem facing the world today’. Thirty percent of respondents ranked economic

- crisis, poverty, and unemployment as their top concern; 24% selected war, conflict, or terrorism; 8% opted for environment or climate change, while the remainder were scattered thinly over a number of other concerns such as HIV/AIDS, moral/spiritual decay, corruption, crime, and the gap between rich and poor.
3. Chief development officer for the American Red Cross, quoted in McCoy and Dorell (2008). He commented that 'this is the worst fundraising environment I've ever worked in.'
  4. Charities Aid Foundation news release: <http://www.cafonline.org/default.aspx?page=16118>
  5. John Shaw, director of finance at Oxfam GB, stated that Oxfam reduced its 2009–2010 forecasted growth from 5–6% to zero (personal communication).
  6. Foundations are trusts financed by corporate philanthropy or endowed by donations or legacies from wealthy individuals, the proceeds from investing which are used to finance philanthropic activities. Some foundations support civil society activities at home or in poorer countries. Many developing countries (such as India, Philippines, and Brazil) have their own foundations, but these tend to be dwarfed by the large US and European foundations.
  7. Also, a survey of some of the largest US foundations, described in Barton and Wilhelm (2009), showed that endowments had declined by a median of 29% from 2007 to 2008 (i.e. before the worst impact of the crisis) and that two-thirds of foundations plan to reduce their giving as a result.
  8. A survey conducted for the UK Charity Commission showed that most had experienced a small fall in income since September 2008 but intended to hold funding levels steady for as long as possible due to the increased social needs (Charity Commission, 2009).
  9. This is shorthand for the anti-neo-liberal activists who variously describe themselves as the anti-globalization, 'alter-globalization', anti-corporate-globalization, or the global social justice movement.
  10. Civil society campaigns related to the World Bank are described in Clark (2002); there is a broader discussion of CSO activities related to governance in Clark (2003).
  11. Examples include campaigns on environmental damage caused by oil, mining, or logging companies, injustices related to the trade in specific commodities exported by developing countries, and the excesses of pharmaceutical or pesticide manufacturers.
  12. There are numerous civil society activities that address corporate governance (e.g. Global Reporting Initiative, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, Transparency International, Publish What You Pay, and Global Justice), but these have little relevance to the current economic crisis. They mostly concern transparency in firms' relations with governments, and few address the banking sector.
  13. A number of CSOs have, however, campaigned for a 'Tobin Tax' on international financial transactions, which would both dampen speculation and mobilize considerable resources for international social and environmental needs. Most notable have been the campaigns of ATTAC (see [www.attac.org](http://www.attac.org)) and Jubilee Debt Campaign and Jubilee Research (see <http://www.jubileeresearch.org/>).
  14. For data on participation by region, see [www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/noticias\\_01.php?cd](http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/noticias_01.php?cd)
  15. Culminating in the 2005 Porto Alegre, when the Forum had 200,000 participants and 2500 workshops.
  16. Clark and Themudo (2006) discuss both the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the Movement.
  17. Guinness Book of Records, 2004.
  18. For a description of the project's intentions, see <http://www.cordobainitiative.org>
  19. In contrast, there were no objections to Roman Catholic centres or National Rifle Association offices in Oklahoma stemming from the faith and political pursuit of that city's bomber, Timothy McVeigh.
  20. See <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11076846>
  21. The author most famously associated with this position is Sam Huntington (1996), whose book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* was extremely popular, especially with US conservatives. However, the first to write on the 'clash of civilizations' was Bernard Lewis (1990), whose article *The Roots of Muslim Rage* is a well-argued and prophetic analysis of growing Muslim–Christian resentment.
  22. Pew Research Center poll of the US public quoted in Grim and Finke (2005).
  23. Ipsos MORI survey for the Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), 20 January 2009, cited by the on-line journal of religious affairs, Ekklesia: <http://www.ekkleisia.co.uk/node/8761>
  24. See the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) website: [www.fatfgafi.org/pages/0,3417,en\\_32250379\\_32236846\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236846_1_1_1_1_1,00.html)
  25. See FATF website. The eight Special Recommendations were expanded to nine in October 2004 with the addition of one concerning 'cash couriers'

26. FATF Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VIII: Non-Profit Organisations; see <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/43/5/38816530.pdf>
27. *Idem*.
28. These prescriptions comprise 'Voluntary Guidelines', rather than international law, but each FATF member government *must* report on its actions with respect to them, and they hence carry considerable weight. Some commentators are worried that they may be used as the basis for future legal requirements.
29. These new US requirements for NGOs and foundations were set out by the US Treasury in late 2002 in *Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities*. These guidelines were revised and released in September 2006. The most recent version is available at [http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/guidelines\\_charities.pdf](http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/guidelines_charities.pdf)
30. When ICNL and other NGOs pointed out that an earlier 990 requirement to name *all* foreign grantees jeopardized the safety of individuals associated with some organizations, the Internal Revenue Service agreed that names of organizations could be withheld if disclosure would likely result in bodily injury.
31. President Obama touched on this issue in his Cairo speech on 4 June 2009. He said 'Freedom of religion is central to the ability of peoples to live together. We must always examine the ways in which we protect it. For instance, in the United States, rules on charitable giving have made it harder for Muslims to fulfill their religious obligation. That's why I'm committed to working with American Muslims to ensure that they can fulfill zakat.'
32. Personal Communication with ICNL's President, Doug Rutzen. See also ICNL's series, *Global Trends in NGO Law* reports.
33. The contribution of man-made emissions to a greenhouse effect is not a new subject; it was first described by the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius in 1895.
34. IPCC comprises 194 governments, each of which appoints representatives to the panel and its affiliate bodies (usually top national scientists).
35. James McCarthy, President-elect of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, informed the US Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, House Science Committee on 28 March 2007 that Exxon-Mobil alone provided almost \$16 million to a network of 43 such groups between 1998 and 2005. The UK's Royal Society expressed concern (in a letter from Bob Ward to the company on 4 September 2005) that in 2005 alone, Exxon had financed 39 US organizations that 'misinformed the public' and 'misrepresented the science of climate change' to the tune of at least \$2.9 million. <http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2006/09/19/LettertoNick.pdf>
36. In 2005, the oil and gas industry were at the 11th position in the league of lobbying expenditures in Washington, DC; by 2009, they had risen to the 2nd place, after the pharmaceutical industry, spending \$168 million in that year, see <http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear=2009&indexType=i>. In the USA, the industry devoted \$168 million to lobbying in 2009 compared with \$22 million by the environment lobby on all their causes (see: <http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php>)
37. A 2007 survey by Harris Interactive of scientists belonging to the American Geophysical Union and the American Meteorological Society (the two US societies whose members are most likely to be involved in climate research) demonstrates scientists' confidence about anthropogenic climate change. Ninety-seven percent agreed that global temperatures have increased during the past 100 years; 84% say that they believe human-induced warming is occurring; and 74% agree that 'currently available scientific evidence' substantiates its occurrence. Only 5% believe that human activity does not contribute to greenhouse warming; and 84% believe that global climate change poses a moderate to very great danger (Lichter, 2008).
38. Sources: <http://www.desmogblog.com/500-scientists-with-documented-doubts-about-the-heartland-institute>, and a semi-retraction from Heartland Institute at [http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results/23207/Controversy\\_Arises\\_Over\\_Lists\\_of\\_Scientists\\_Whose\\_Research\\_Contradicts\\_ManMade\\_Global\\_Warming\\_Scares.html](http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results/23207/Controversy_Arises_Over_Lists_of_Scientists_Whose_Research_Contradicts_ManMade_Global_Warming_Scares.html).
39. For example, the American Enterprise Institute wrote to climate scientists in 2006 offering large 'honoraria' for 'reviews and policy critiques' of a forthcoming IPCC report. Some recipients saw this as a crude attempt to fish for criticisms. See <http://sciencepoliticsclimatechange.blogspot.com/2006/07/aei-and-ar4.html>. The full AEI letter is available at <http://www.aei.org/article/25586>.
40. The most prominent such climate scientist is Professor Richard Lindzen, a meteorologist and former member of the IPCC. Lindzen's arguments largely emphasize the complexity of factors making for climate change, and while recognizing that the average temperatures have risen since the industrial

revolution began, he argues that it is not possible to assign all this to man-made emissions, that it is not possible to predict future trends and, therefore, that the confidence of predictions of catastrophic climate change is unwarranted.

41. For example, they disseminate graphs showing average global temperatures for a few carefully selected recent years to suggest that there is cooling rather than warming and omitting to recognize that climate scientists are looking at trends over decades and centuries, rather than at short-term patterns.
42. These emails dating from 1991 to 2009 were largely between Jones and fellow IPCC members. They were obtained by hacking into the CRU email system and first posted on a small web-server in the Siberian city of Tomsk (see Schiermeier, 2009.). By taking sentences out of context, the leaks were used to promote a false impression that Jones' work deliberately cut out data that muddied the systemic rise in global temperatures and that he sought to remove from IPCC's literature database articles that ran counter to the field's orthodoxy. Furthermore, by inference, they promoted the idea that *everyone* involved in the IPCC is similarly biased and complicit in a grand deception.
43. Surveys by the Pew Research Center (2009) show that there has been a sharp decline in the percentage of Americans who believe that there is solid evidence that global temperatures are rising—from 77% in August 2006 to 57% in October 2009—while those recognizing global warming as a very serious problem has fallen from 44% in April 2008 to 35% in October 2009.
44. All these statements come from the pages on climate change from the NGOs' respective websites.
45. The error was in IPCC's Working Group II report, 2007, *Impacts, Adaption and Vulnerability*, [http://www.ipcc.ch/publications\\_and\\_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch10s10-6-2.html](http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch10s10-6-2.html). It derived from an annex to the report from WWF Nepal, dated 2005: *An overview of glaciers, glacier retreat, and subsequent impacts in Nepal, India and China*. Three other errors have been detected in the same report. Given the damage even one or two errors do to IPCC's credibility, it is under pressure to strengthen its review processes, see [http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2245&utm\\_source=feedburner&utm\\_medium=feed&utm\\_campaign=Feed%3A+YaleEnvironment360+\(Yale+Environment+360\)](http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2245&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+YaleEnvironment360+(Yale+Environment+360)).
46. One measure that is supported by some CSOs but criticized by others is the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries scheme (REDD), in which carbon taxes and other resources from rich countries finance measures designed to increase CO<sub>2</sub> capture in poorer countries.
47. See 'We the peoples: civil society, the United Nations and global governance', UN General Assembly document, A/58/817, 11 June 2004 report; see also Trägårdh (2007).

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